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CHRISTOPHER FELLING
1. Childhood and Development
Immediately we consider Plutarch's treatment of his heroes' childhood, we
find ourselves confronting a strange paradox.' He is clearly most interested
in childhood and education; indeed, it is the exclusive concern of several of
his moral essays.^ He has a quite elaborate theory of youthful development,
drawing heavily on the Aristotelian ethic: our initial 5uvd|iei(; render us
capable of feeling and responding to specific TtdGri, and our responses
gradually constitute particular e^ek; of habitual activity; these eventually
evolve into settled tiGti which inform our moral choices. All that comes out
particularly clearly in the De uirtute morali. Naturally enough, he insists
that moral development of character is the norm for all human beings, and
that education has a peculiar value in moulding character and restraining
passions. 3 Naturally enough, too, in the Lives he makes a good deal of
whatever childhood material he finds in his sources, often straining
uncomfortably to extract unreasonably large consequences from slight
anecdotes (.Sulla is a good example of that). He also gives extensive space
' This paper overlaps closely wiih my essay on "Childhood and Personality in Greek
Biography" (henceforth "Childhood"), lo appear in Characterization and Individuality in Greek
Literature, a collection of essays which I am editing for the Oxford University Press (1989): but
the scope of that essay did not allow any extended treatment of individual Lives, nor any
discussion of the distinguished analysis of Dihle. Some of the points are also treated in an essay
on "Plutarch: Roman heroes and Greek Culture" (henceforth "Roman heroes"), to appear in
Philosophia Togata (ed. J. Barnes and M. T. Griffin [Oxford 1989]). The present article is
lightly annotated: further argument and exemplification of several points may be found in those
papers. I apologise for this immodest ring of self-reference, and hope readers will not find the
circle too vicious.
^ Especially De profectibus in uirtute. An uirtus doceri possit? , andDe audiendis poetis.
' Mor. 392b-e, cf. e. g. 28d-e. 37d-e, 76d-e, 82b-c, 83e-f. 450f, 453a. 551c-552d, 584e.
Inherited nature was of course important too, as those passages show. Cf. esp. C. J. Gill, "The
Question of Character-development: Plutarch and Tacitus," CQ 33 (1983) 469-87. For
education as a civilising and restraining force in the Lives, cf. esp. Cor. 1. 4-5, Mar. 2. 2—4,
Them. 2. l,Numa 26 (4). 10-12; B. Bucher-Isler. Norm und Individualitdt in den Biographien
Plutarchs (Noctes Romanae 13 [Bern and Stuttgart 1972]) 21, 24, 49, 67-«.
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to education—to isolating the teachers of Pericles, for instance, or stressing
Lucullus' or Cicero's early intellectual prowess. And there are times when
he shrewdly points to the importance of influences, sometimes in ways
which involve quite extensive psychological reconstruction: the effect on
the young Cleomenes of his marriage to Agis' widow, for instance, when
she would constantly describe to him those stirring events {Ag.—CI. 22 [1].
3); the influence on Marcellus of being brought up at a time when Rome
was constantly at war, so that he had no time to indulge his supposed taste
for Hellenic culture (Marc. 1); the impact on Theseus of the heroics of his
kinsman Heracles (esp. Thes. 6. 8-8. 2, 11. 2); the effect on Coriolanus of
his close and dominant mother (Cor. 4. 5-8). All this seems to bring
Plutarch surprisingly close to the themes and interests of modem biography,
witli its taste for tracing influences and psychological development, and for
bringing out and explaining individual differences.
And yet so often these interests of Plutarch seem to lead to peculiarly
shallow and disappointing results. So often his treatment of childhood itself
is banal and unpenetrating; so often we are left with very little idea of any
evolution of the grown man; and, despite those few cases where he does go
in for psychological reconstruction, so often he seems to regard
understanding the development of his heroes as a surprisingly low priority.
Why? It is not a shortage of material; true, he is reluctant to supplement it
irresponsibly—but we can also often see him failing to analyse the material
he does have, or to carry through the sort of reconstruction of which he was
capable. Why doesn't he reconstruct how the elder Cato or Marius must
have felt, when they first came from the country to join in smart city life?
Or what it must have been like for an Artaxerxes or a Timoleon in the
nursery, with such dominant and powerful brothers? Or what Agesilaus
must have felt about his lameness, or Themistocles about his dubious
parentage? Plutarch has the resources to make such reconstructions, and the
interest in youthful development to encourage them: Cleomenes shows
that, or Theseus, or Coriolanus; and in each case the theme is stressed
enough—rusticity, or the brothers, or the physical disability, or the
bastardy. Yet the psychological capital made of it is curiously
disappointing, and we are not really led to any deeper understanding of the
heroes or their development.
Albrecht Dihle offers a most interesting explanation in his Studien zur
griechischen Biographie (Gottingen 1956), when he points to a difference
between modem and ancient ideas of the personality.'' He suggests that
modem writers postulate a large number of varied predispositions (Anlagen)
in a personality: some are aroused and fostered by specific experiences,
especially in childhood; others become stunted or atrophied; and we place
especial weight on the irrational in describing these distinctive experiences,
* Ch. 4, esp. pp. 76-81.
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and the psychic drives which they encourage or deflect. Such an analysis
need not put especial weight on the development of "the moral will" or
"moral consciousness" (though it certainly need not deny that such a will or
consciousness exists, with the function of ethically assessing and censoring
a person's Anlagen and accommodating them with life's demands): still, a
figure can often be represented as passive, a locus for the various
predispositions and stimuU to fight it out. This modem picture does clearly
posit a complex process of the development of personality, even if it finds
little to say about the development of the moral will or consciousness.
Plutarch, by contrast, is firmly in the Peripatetic tradition in stressing the
moral will. It is that which controls the way in which one's original
6tivdn.ei<; respond to particular TidOri, ensuring that these are controlled and
guided in such a way that a pattern of ethical conduct (e^iq) is followed,
which is gradually strengthened into a stable aspect of a person's character
(Ti9oq).5 The irrational is relevant to the portrait, but only in defining the
quality of the thxGti and the Suvdneiq that enable us to respond to them;
and it will be natural to concentrate less on the SDvdjxeii; or the naQi\
themselves than on the rational moral will or consciousness that masters
them, something that (again in Aristotelian fashion) will be visible in the
adult's moral choices which those settled riGri inform. Thus the irrational
typically remains at a level below that of the Uterary presentation, assumed
as part of the individual's development but not explicitly traced. "It is
evident," concludes Dihie, "that in so narrow a biographical psychology the
modem conception of development has no place."
There is much to admire in this extremely subtle analysis.^ Dihle is
certainly right to draw attention to our view of a person's complex blend of
varied Anlagen, and his stress on Plutarch's conception of moral will is also
illuminating: the development of such an undifferentiated moral will is very
much the register in which education is treated, at least when it is
successful—in the cases of Aemilius, for example, or Brutus, or even (with
some qualifications) Pericles? Such a will should give one control of the
TidSri (cf. esp. Mor. nd-7S&, 82b-c); and Dihle is right to suggest that
there is more interest in emphasising the will than in the differentiated
analysis of the naQr[ themselves, even in cases where those TtdBtj are
important to Plutarch's view of his central figure. But some qualifications
should still be made.
First, Dihle's analysis of modern assumptions is closer to theoretical
psychology than biographical practice. With some exceptions, especially
' Cf. esp. Mor. 31b-c, 443d. 451b ff.. 467b.
* And reviewers of Dihle have been properly admiring: cf. esp. K. von Fritz, Gnom. 28
(1956)329-31.
' On Aemilius cf. "Roman heroes," pp. 215-16 and "Childhood", n. 60; on Brutus, "Roman
heroes," pp. 222-28; on Pericles, "Childhood," section H.
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the psychoanalytic school,^ modem biography does not especially
concentrate on these irrational elements in childhood; it may include them,
but the early display or development of rational traits tends to be much more
stressed
—
particularly in political biography, where the comparison with
Plutarch is sharpest, and where a certain gravity and respect for the subject
normally inhibits too strong a stress on the irrational.' Dihle's analysis is
in fact as redolent of Proust as it is of Freud, and in many ways it suits the
biographical or autobiographical novel better than biography itself: it is
suggestive that Dihle's sole example is not a biography at all but the
Entwicklungsroman "Griine Heinrich."'" And even such novels do not
characteristically analyse the predispositions which remain stunted or
undeveloped, only those which prefigure important later traits; such an
analysis is not far removed from the Peripatetic treatment of 5-uvdnEi(; and
TtdGri which interact to produce later characteristics. G^ihle reasonably
observes that the interaction is now described rather differently. We tend to
speak of a constant mutual interaction, with Anlagen refined and remoulded
as a result of experiences; whereas the Peripatetic analysis would regard the
8t)vd(iei.(; as a constant given, and the interaction as producing distinct
e^Eii; and eventually r\^. But the difference is at least in part semantic).
Indeed, in many ways Plutarch stresses irrational TidGri more, not less,
than his modem counterparts, at least when he is describing adult figures.
This is particularly clear in cases such as Marius, Coriolanus, Demetrius, or
Antony, where heroes are clearly bad at controlling their passions; but the
phenomenon is in fact much more widespread. Time and again we find
Plutarch analysing heroes' self-control, and finding them lacking: and we
find this particularly frequently in cases where Hellenic education is in
point." Marcellus, for instance, had Hellenic tastes, and did his best to
indulge them in a warlike period: but he was eventually destroyed by his
inability to control his natural bellicosity. Cicero was extraordinarily
educated, yet so often he showed himself unable to match up to the
emotional demands of the political choices he had to make, and unworthily
followed the instincts of his TidGri rather than his reason: in his poor
showing in exile, for instance, or in his choice of sides in the civil war, or
in his extravagant reaction to his daughter's death. Some people did better,
for instance Aemilius, again a man with educated and Hellenic tastes, or
Brutus and the younger Cato, both followers of Greek philosophy; others
worse, particularly those whose education was lacking—Marius,
*Most influeniially Erikson's Young Man Luther (New York 1958), though ironically his
book was published two years after Dihle's.
' This emerges from the examples I discuss in "Childhood," section IH.
'" Dihle, p. 76: this is also noted by Gill, art. ciL (above, n. 3), 471 n. 16.
" This point is extensively argued in "Roman heroes," whence the following examples are
drawn, and in Part 11 of Simon Swain's Oxford D. Phil, thesis, "Plutarch and Rome: three
studies" (1987).
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Coriolanus—or whose Hellenism was defective, like the elder Cato. This
link of the naQr\ with education is unsurprising, given Plutarch's stress on
education as the vital prerequisite for self-control: but this leads us back to
the original paradox. Plutarch stresses these nd&r) in later life, but does
very little to trace the development of a hero's self-control in the crucial
years of his youth. Admittedly, we do sometimes find something of the
kind: Coriolanus' mother stimulating his pride, for instance, or Heracles
setting Theseus alight with ambition. Nothing precluded such analysis; but
the oddity is that it is so rare, when it is precisely what the interest in the
TtdGri and their Unkage with youth and education would seem to demand.
We still need an explanation, and the attitude to the irrational does not offer
iu it instead makes the problem more pressing.
In fact it is questionable how far the Peripatetic theory of character
illuminates this question. Indeed, that theor>' would seem to encourage
treatment of character-development, with its emphasis on that development
of e'cEiq and that gradual formation of ti^tj. Aristotle himself is vers- clear
that both intellectual and moral virtues require development, though it is of
a different kind in each case (iV. E. 2. 1 103al4 ff.); and children have their
distinctive pleasures, which ever>'one likes to grow out of, and their
disuncuve values {N. E. 10. 117al-4. 1176b21-33, cf. 3. 1119b5-7). It is
Utterly appropriate that he should end Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics by
giving us advice on how to manage our own development, and Book 10 by
a more general treatment of education and its importance. If anything, it is
Peripatetic practice that goes the other way—the failure of Theophrastus, for
instance, to generate much interest in the background or development of
individual figures: and indeed the same goes for Aristotle himself, in his
typed sketches in .V.£. 4 and in his stray biographical comments
elsewhere.'- In fact, Aristotle and Theophrastus seem to proWde their own
version of the paradox we ha\e already noticed with Plutarch: a theor>'
which implies a considerable preoccupation with education and development,
but a curious absence of that preoccupation in practice.
But in their cases it is easier to see why; and this may give a hint for
Plutarch too. Dihle himself ver> propedy brings out what Theophrastus
and Aristode are tr>ing to do in producing such stereotyped portraits.-- They
are not suggesting that such t>pes exhaust the definition of any indiN-idual
human's personahty, but rather providing a convenient shorthand portrait of
a particular ti9ck; which an individual may show, along, doubtless, v^-ith
many other such tiDti. And those t>ped figures need not even preclude a
measure of development:''* it is simply that in such cases the development
would not be ver>' complex or interesting. Plutarch's figiires, as again Dihle
stresses, are much more individuated, even if (say'* his Nicias owes
'^ For these cf. G. L. HiL-dey. ".\risioUes Interest m Biography," GRBS 15 (1974) 203-13.
" Dihle. 71-73.
" For Theophrastus cf. Gill. art. ciu (n. 3). 469 n. 4.
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something to a Peripatetic typed 5eioi5aip.cov. His biographical insight is
so much richer than anything we can confidently ascribe to the Peripatetics,
and if he uses their categories he does so with much more discrimination and
human insight. In these more complex cases we might consequently expect
development to be more complex too, and at first sight it is still surprising
that, in this most obvious area, we seem to have no advance at all. But
something like the same explanation may still be the right one. Plutarch's
figures may be more complex, but not, perhaps, in a way which needs to
posit a particularly singular or interesting process of development.
Here we should follow a different hint of Dihle's account. So far we
have been talking only of the complexity of the varied "predispositions" of a
child: but just as important is the differing degree of complexity of traits in
the formed, adult character, a point which Dihie has made a few pages earlier
(72). Moderns love complex characters, and particularly love the
idiosyncratic, paradoxical combination of unexpected traits—in Wilamowitz'
words, "the contradictions that are found in every soul of any richness, and
whose unification alone creates a person's individuality."'^ Ancient authors
were less wedded to such quirkiness. Critics often warn us not to expect the
idiosyncratic in the characters of Greek Tragedy: the individuality of a
Clytemnestra or a Philoctetes certainly remains, but it is an individuality of
a different sort from ours.'^ The same applies to Plutarch. His characters
too are individuated, but they are what I have elsewhere called "integrated"
characters:'^ a man's qualities are brought into some sort of relation with
one another, and every trait goes closely with the next. We are unsurprised
if Antony is simple, passive, ingenuous, susceptible, soldierly, boisterous,
yet also noble and often brilliant; or the younger Cato is high-principled and
determined, rigid in his philosophy, scruffy (as philosophical beings often
are), strange but bizarrely logical in the way he treats his women, and
disablingly inflexible and insensitive in public life. These are not
stereotypes, but the different qualities cluster very naturally: Wilamowitz
would hardly speak of such combinations as "the contradictions . . . whose
unification done creates a person's individuality." Even an Alcibiades is not
^^Internationale Wochenschrift fiir Wissenschaft, Kunst md Technik 1 (1907), 1109 (=
Kleine Schriften VI [Berlin and Amsterdam 1972] 124)—a fine, provocative passage, which is
subjected to an extended critique in the concluding chapter to Characterization and Individuality
(as in n. 1, above).
'*Cf. e. g. P. E. Easterling, "Character in Sophocles." G & R 24 (1977) 121. 124 ( = E.
Segal [ed.]. Oxford Readings in Greek Tragedy [Oxford 1983] 138. 140-41); S. Goldhill,
Reading Greek Tragedy (Cambridge 1986) 174. Exactly how that residual individuality is to be
defined is a challenging question, addressed by several of the contributors to Characterization and
Individuality.
'' Cf. "Childhood," section HI, where I give an extended comparison with the more elaborate
way in which Lytton Strachey treats childhood. For similar remarks cf. R. B. Rutherford, "The
Philosophy of the Odyssey," JHS 1 06 (1 986) 1 49-50 and n. 3 1 ; for a contrary view. N. Rudd,
Lines (^Enquiry (Cambridge 1976) 160-62.
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manysided in a modem sense, any more than Homer's Odysseus: both can
be described swiftly and adequately, and even in such cases every trait really
predicts the next. One could even talk meaningfully of "a sort of person
like" Antony, or Alexander, or even Alcibiades: one might not meet that
"sort of person" very often, but at least their qualities group together so
naturally that they could conceivably recur again in the same blend in
another human being. Talk of "a sort of person like" Hamlet, or Prince
Andr6, or Hedda Gabler would seem distinctly more peculiar.
Such "integrated" characters leave distinctly less to be explained than, in
the world of the idiosyncratic, we have come to expect. Today writers have
to foreshadow or explain a considerable multiplicity of divergent traits, and
are often striving to explain why such a unique combination could possibly
have come about. With idiosyncratic characters, development is typically
problematic. For Plutarch it is much simpler. A few childhood traits,
broadly sketched, can suffice, not because the adult personality is going to
show only those traits, but because any new adult traits will naturally
complement the ones we know from childhood. The infant Cato is
determined, humourless, and intense, and it is not difficult to see how these
early traits group naturally with those which develop later, the political
inflexibility, the philosophy, the bizarre treatment of his women. Nothing
is surprising as the characterisation deepens, and nothing requires any
particularly refined explanation. It is not that his characters are "static,"'*
but their development is, for our tastes, curiously straightforward. Even in
the cases of the uneducated or ill-controlled, he can allow the points to come
out gradually throughout the Life, as he will be painting them with a very
broad brush. If we wish, we will not find it difficult to infer what their
childhood must have been like—but, however important their development
may have been, it will not have been especially differentiated, or necessarily
very arresting. Plutarch does not need to strain from the outset to extract
every ounce of understanding, as so many of his modem counterparts do.
There is so much less to understand.
Nor, finally, should we relate this "integration" to distinctively
Peripatetic thought. Aristotle's ethical theory can leave it open for a
character to show any number of distinct tiGti, in any sort of relation to one
another (though it is true that his virtuous man will not vary over so large a
range). The assumptions in fact go much deeper: this integration is an
almost universal ancient habit, and indeed one shown by many more recent
civilisations as well as the Greek. It is very much our post-Romantic
nineteenth-and twentieth-century culture which is the odd one out, with our
particular taste for the idiosyncratic and the quirky.
'* On this see the thoughtful treatment of Gill, art. cit (n. 3).
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2. Aratus and "integrated" characters
It is still possible to claim that some ancient authors integrated more fully
than others, and that Plutarch's integration was particularly thoroughgoing.
The comparison with his contemporary Suetonius already suggests as much:
Suetonius' style of presentation by categories is much better suited to
bringing out a modem style of manysidedness, and the protean complexities
of a Julius Caesar emerge more clearly from Suetonius' Life than from
Plutarch's. Suetonius' Augustus, his Claudius, even his Vespasian are
rather in the same mould. But a more telUng comparison can be drawn from
the case of Plutarch's Aratus. Polybius had commented on the man's varied
character:
He had in general all the qualities that go to make a perfect man of affairs.
He was a powerful speaker and a clear thinker and had the faculty of keeping
his own counsel. In his power of dealing suavely with political opponents,
of attaching friends to himself and forming fresh alliances he was second to
none. He also had a marvellous gift for devising coups de main,
stratagems, and ruses against the enemy, and for executing such with the
utmost personal courage and endurance .... But this very same man,
when he undertook field operations, was slow in conception, timid in
performance, and devoid of personal courage. The consequence was that he
filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and in
this respect the enemy could always get the better of him. So true it is that
there is something multiform (jioA.\)Ei5eq) in the nature not only of men's
bodies, but of their minds, so that not merely in pursuits of a different class
the same man has a talent for some and none for others, but often in the
case of such pursuits as are similar the same man may be most intelligent
and most dull, or most audacious and most cowardly. For instance some
men are most bold in facing the charge of savage beasts in the chase but are
poltroons when they meet an armed enemy ... I say this in order that my
readers may not refuse to trust my judgement, because in some cases I
make contrary pronouncements regarding the conduct of the same men even
when engaged in pursuits of a like nature.
(Polybius 4. 8. 1-9, 12, trans. Paton.)
That was a passage Plutarch knew;'' but, when he gave his own summary of
the man's character at Aral. 10, the emphasis was subtly different.^
" Some influence of Polybius on Aratus is anyway clear (especially at 38. 12 and 47-48):
cf. the commentaries of W. H. Porter (Dublin and Cork 1937), xv, xviii, and A. J. Koster
(Leiden 1937), xvi-xvii, xxvi, li-liii. But in this case we also find some odd verbal echoes,
with Polybius' vocabulary or conceits transferred to Plutarch's own summary in Aral. 10 but
exploited in slightly different contexts: iJnaiBpo?, for instance (Plb. 4. 8. 5 = Aral. 10. 4), or
eniPoXaic; (Plb. 4. 8. 5) = ETtTiPoXortaToi; (Aral. 10. 2), or ev oyei (Plb. 4. 8. 5) = oyeii;
(Aral. 10. 4), as well as the odd emphasis on npaotric; (Plb. 4. 8. 2, Aral. 10. 2) and the more
natural one on £u<p«ia (Plb. 4. 8. 7 = Aral. 10. 5) or t6X|iti (Plb. 4. 8. 3, 7 = Aral. 10. 3); the
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Aratus was a natural politician, great-spirited, more attentive to the
commonwealth than his own affairs, bitterly hating tyranny, and
developing friendships and enmities to suit the public good. For this
reason he seems to have been less consistent as a friend than generous and
merciful as an enemy: he changed his tack in both directions according to
his statesmanship, and the needs of the moment. His ambition was to
bring states together into alliances; he was eager for a union, a theatre
speaking with one voice—as eager for this as for any noble ideal. He was
lacking in confidence and pessimistic about open warfare, but the sharpest
of men when it came to guileful initiatives, or secret negotiations to bring
cities and tyrants to his side. For this reason his enterprise brought many
unexpected successes, but he also seems to have failed to gain many
possible successes because of his caution. The sight of certain wild beasts,
it seems, is acute at night but dulled in the day, with the moisture of the
eye turning dry and insubstantial as it cannot bear contact with the light:
and in just the same way there is a sort of human cleverness (Seivotiic;)
and understanding (ouveok;) which by its nature is easily permrbed in open
and public encounters, but gains courage when it comes to secret,
undercover initiatives. This sort of inconsistency is created in gifted people
by a lack of philosophical training, for they produce virtue without
knowledge as if it were a self-seeded fruit, with no cultivation . .
.
Plutarch's Aratus is more clearly guided by his state's shifting needs,
which prepares us for an underlying rationality that explains some of the
surface inconsistencies: Polybius began the chapter on that note, but put it
less sharply and pressed it less insistently. Plutarch's Aratus shows
"caution" rather than Polybius' "cowardice" in open warfare (and the point
recurs in Plutarch's later narrative, especially at 31. 2-^ and 35-36):^' that
too sits more comfortably with the initiatives he did undertake, and the
contrast becomes a more explicable one, the politician who prefers guile to
the dangers of open fighting, who shows daring in one sphere but not in a
different one. Polybius' formulation in fact captures the difference very
clearly: his Aratus shows inconsistency in, explicitly, the same sort of
pursuits; Plutarch's two spheres are more distinct. Polybius consequently
wild-beast image oi Aral. 10. 4 also recalls the hunting parallel of Plb. 4. 8. 9. D. A. RusseU
observed a similar phenomenon in Plutarch's use of Dionysius in Coriolanus, and fairly
concluded that "it is perfectly possible that, when he came to his own writing, whole stretches
of Dionysius' not very memorable prose were running in his head" (JRS 53 [1963] 22 and n. 7):
the same goes for Polybius' rather more memorable phrases here.
^ Kosler (as n. 19), xxxxiv, is enthusiastic but perhaps a little over-simple: "at nobis . . .
profitendum est, cum eademfere de Arali moribus uterque scripserit (my italics), suavitatem
quandam orationis et breviiatem nos magis delectare quam loquacitatem Polybii."
^' For the dispute cf. also 29. 7-8: but even there Plutarch notes only that others derided
Aratus' cowardice, without explicitly endorsing the criticisms. The contrast of Aral. 35. 6 and
the parallel narrative at Ag.-Cl. 25 (4). 9 is particularly suggestive. Aratus' caution is at least
explicable, probably even approved, in Aral., but derided in Cleomenes: such aspects as the
smallness of Qeomenes' force are suppressed in the Aral, version.
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directs more attention to Aratus' demeanour in covert action, stressing his
endurance (KaKO7td0eia) as well as his daring, and that sharpens the
contrast with the battlefield cowardice, which is inexplicably so different:
Plutarch concentrates more on the planning than the action, and the spheres
are again more widely separate, one much more mental, one more physical.
And the inconsistency that remains is also dealt with differendy. Polybius
regards it as an individual quirk of Aratus, and makes it a general truth of
human nature that such quirks are often found—a very unusual emphasis for
an ancient author. Plutarch rather stresses that the combination of such
traits is a regular one, that this sort of differentiated 8eiv6i;rii; is not at all
unnatural, and could easily recur. That, in the terms discussed above, is
"integration": Plutarch is stressing how regular the cluster of traits really
is. We could readily find the cluster recurring in another person, and hence
it would be natural to talk of "a sort of person like Aratus": but like
Plutarch's Aratus, not Polybius'.
The end of Plutarch's chapter confirms the relevance of childhood: "this
sort of inconsistency is created in gifted people by a lack of philosophical
training, for they produce virtue without knowledge as if it were a self-
seeded fruit, with no cultivation." The first point to notice is simply that
Plutarch can generalise in that way: "this sort of inconsistency is produced
. .
." It evidently happens all the time, and regularly for the same reasons.
Polybius' generalisation rather took the form that "any sort of inconsistency
can happen," because humans are like that: if such inconsistency is to be
explained, then different explanations will be needed in each case. Secondly,
the sort of explanation Plutarch favours turns so very naturally to childhood;
but, once again, for our tastes it is so shallow. What is there, or what is
good, comes from education: what is absent or bad comes from the lack of
it. He does not feel the need to differentiate exactly what Aratus learnt from
any particular school or tutor; indeed, it is striking that in the chapters on
Aratus' youth he said virtually nothing about education, leaving the point
for this later development. As in Marius and even Marcellus, defective
education seems important to understanding the hero: but in the early
chapters of all these Lives Plutarch does not feel the need to trace the theme
in any detail. For him, the phenomenon of this sort of 8eiv6-tri(; is so
regular, and comes about for such uniform educational reasons, just like
Marcellus' bellicosity or Marius' lack of self-control. It is so easy to work
out what the crucial education must have been like, and there is so litde that
is individual to say. There is no problem in understanding how this Aratus
became "the sort of person" he is. Had Polybius grasped the nettle of
explaining his quirkier, more irregular blend of traits, the analysis of
development would have had to be distincUy more differentiated.
That concluding su-ess on education may still seem surprisingly
intrusive and unsubtle; but it is less surprising specifically in Aratus, where
the moralism is often rather cruder and more explicit than in the Parallel
Lives (cf. e.g. 9. 7, 19. 4, 25. 7, 26. 4-5, 30. 2, 38. 5-12, 44. 6). It is
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indeed a very pedagogic Life, as the introduction makes clear: Plutarch is
providing Polycrates with a model for his own two sons to imitate (1. 5-6),
hoping that they will be inspired to emulate the virtues of their ancestor.
But first they need to sit at their books: the emphasis on education suits the
youthful audience, and indeed a similar point is made a few chapters later,
when Antigonus' pleasures are sadly lacking in A-oyio^oq, that distinctive
attribute of the rational, educated man (17. 7). Not, of course, that Plutarch
would wish the sons of Polycrates to go out and try to rebuild the Achaean
League; or assert the independence of Hellas; or even emulate Aratus'
peculiar knack for getting on with foreign kings—though the relevance of
that to the present time might, in a cruder author, seem more immediate.
But Plutarch is not so crude; and his political sense is much too acute for
the assumption of such unsophisticated parallels between past and present.
But there are still lessons of virtue and vice for history to teach to public
men.22
This peculiarly insistent moralism may prompt further suspicions
about the "integration." One effect of this form of characterisation is to
reduce Aratus to more of a type; and it is natural to wonder if the typical
nature of such a hero goes along with a certain sort of moralism, and certain
taste for the exemplary. After all, Plutarch's Aratus has a much clearer
paradigmatic relevance than Polybius': his brand of 5eiv6tti<; and ouveok;
are represented as familiar human traits, familiar enough for us to be on the
look out for them in ourselves and others, and to draw conclusions.
Polycrates' sons could indeed find, or themselves develop into, "a sort of
person like Aratus": the more regular the combination of traits, the easier it
is to extract morals, and the more generally applicable those morals will be.
It would doubtless be a mistake to assume that the search for exemplariness
is necessarily primary—that Plutarch consciously reduced a character's
singularity in order to make it more straightforward to extract his morals for
everyday life: integration came more naturally to him than so coldblooded
an analysis would suggest. But one can at least suspect that the two
tendencies reinforced one another, that integration encouraged or facilitated
the extraction of morals, and the taste for morals reinforced the assumption
of integration. And in the case of Aratus the moral can indeed be a
straightforward, protreptic one. The sons of Polycrates should try to be like
Aratus in some ways but not in others; and if they set to their education like
good boys, they may prove worthy of their ancestral model, and in some
way may even improve on him. The moral, like the character, is very
straightforward.
^ Mor. 457a ff., 814a-c clarify his view on the moral lessons which history can leach
contemporary politicians.
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3. Lysander
Lysander is less straightforward, both in its characterisation and in its
moralism: the character is much less clearly a type, and the extraction of
morals becomes a more delicate business. But there are similarities too, for
here again we have an "integrated" character, even if a more singular and
elaborate one; here too we have an interest in childhood and childhood
influences, but one which might seem curiously shallow; and here again
this is largely because even so complex a character is not too difficult to
understand. Plutarch was not straining all the time to penetrate a
problematic character, as a modem biographer might Other things mattered
more.
The interest in childhood influences is immediately clear, and so is the
concern to relate Lysander to the norms of Spartan behaviour:
2. 1 It is said thai Lysander's father, Aristocleitus, did not belong to the
royal family, though he was descended from the children of Heracles.
2 Lysander himself was brought up in poverty, and showed himself as
amenable as any Spartan to training in the customs of his country: he
showed too that he had a manly spirit and was indifferent to all
pleasures, except for those which honoured and successful men win by
3 their own glorious exploits—and indeed it is no disgrace for a young
Spartan to yield to these. The Spartans expect their boys from the
very first to be conscious of public opinion, to take any censure
deeply to heart as well as to exult in praise, and anyone who remains
indifferent or fails to respond to these sentiments is despised as an idle
4 clod, utterly lacking in any ambition to excel. This kind of ambition
and contentiousness ((piXotinov . . . koI (piXoviKov), then, had
been implanted in Lysander by his Spartan training, and it would be
unfair to blame his natural disposition too much in this respect. On
the other hand he seems to have displayed a gift for paying court to the
powerful such as one would not expect in a Spartan, and to have been
able to bear the arrogance of those in authority when it was necessary:
that is a quality which some people regard as an important element in
5 political shrewdness. Aristotle, when he observes that great natures,
such as those of Socrates, Plato, and Heracles, are especially prone to
melancholy, notes that Lysander also became a prey to melancholy,
not at first, but in his later years.
6 The most distinctive fact about his character, however, is that
although he himself endured poverty honourably, and was never
enslaved or even momentarily corrupted by money, he nevertheless
filled his own country not merely with riches but with the craving for
them, and he deprived Sparta of the admiration she had always enjoyed
for her indifference to wealth. This came about because he brought
immense quantities of gold and silver into Sparta after the war with
7 Athens, although he did not keep a single drachma for himself. On
another occasion, when Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, sent
Lysander's daughters some luxurious Sicilian tunics, he refused them,
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saying that he was afraid they would make his daughters look uglier.
8 A little later an ambassador was sent from the same city, Sparta, to
the same ruler.^ Dionysius presented the ambassador with two dresses
and told him to choose whichever he preferred and take it back to his
daughter: the ambassador answered that she could choose better
herself, and took both dresses away with him.
(LySander 2, translated Scott-Kilvert [adapted]).
One typical feature of Plutarch's technique is his progressive redefinition of
character.^ He tends to begin by presenting traits or themes rather crudely
and bluntly, only later complementing and refining and adding the
subtleties, and a character tends to become more singular as his Life
progresses. The same technique is used here to define Lysander's relation to
the conventions of his city. At first he is not an especially singular figure:
indeed, his "ambition and contentiousness" (2. 4) are two of the most
regular traits in Plutarch's repertoire;^ and, for the moment, it is these
characteristics which
—
perhaps surprisingly, at least in the case of
"contentiousness"^^—are related to his Spartan education (2. 2-4). At this
point the explicitly unspartan qualities are only his capacity to pay court to
the powerful, and his curious attitude to money: Plutarch points the
paradox that he was impervious to greed himself, but eventually filled
Sparta with wealth, to her ultimate catastrophe. But the Life goes on to
stress how the "ambition and contentiousness"—the Spartan traits
—
gave
rise to a much wider range of unspartan behaviour, not just in paying court
to foreign potentates, but also in Lysander's deviousness, his versatility and
enterprise, his religious unscrupulousness (explicitly "unspartan" at 8. 5),
and his shrewd but bloody exploitation of party divisions in foreign states in
the interest of his own followers. Lysander understands and exploits
unspartan qualities in others, whether enterprise or greed (3, 4. 6-7, 5. 5 ff.,
13. 5 ff., 19. 4),2'' and ends as a very individual figure himself, vitally
" On the interprelalion of this passage see D. Sansone and R. Renehan, CP 76 (1981) 202-
07. Both rightly insist that Lysander must here be contrasled with a separate "ambassador." The
text had hitherto been read as if Lysander himself was the ambassador, so that Plutarch would be
contrasting his earlier and later behaviour; that would be clumsy Greek, leaving ex xfj^ avTTli;
jcoXeco^ particularly pointless, and incoherent in view of Lysander's later characterisation. I
follow Renehan in assuming that no textual alteration is necessary to support the
rcinterpretation.
^ On this technique cf. my commentary on Antony (Cambridge 1988) 12-13, 25, 42—43;
and "Childhood," section 11.
" Cf. Bucher-Isler (as n. 3). 1 1-13, 31. 41, and especially 58-59; D. A. Russell, "Plutarch,
•Alcibiades- \-\(>:' PCPS 12(1966)38.
^ Cf. below, p. 272.
^ There are times when close comparison with other sources reveals Pluurch's distinctive
emphases. For instance, in ch. 3 he affords much more space than Xenophon or Diodorus to the
seething entrepot Ephesus. a very unspartan milieu which Lysander knows how to exploit; and
at 4. 6-7 he puts more weight than his source Xenophon on the consequences of extracting the
extra obol from Cyrus—the extensive desertions from the enemy fleet, seduced by that greed
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different from the norms of his country—indeed, so unspartan that he even
tries to subvert the whole constitution (24. 3-6, cf. 30. 3-5, Sulla 40[2]).
He is contrasted with a series of foils who are much more predictable in
their Spartan ways:^* first the avaricious ambassador of 2. 8; then, more
elaborately, the conventional CalUcratidas at 5. 7-7. 1, with his simpUcity,
pride, and justice, "worthy of Sparta" as they are (7. 1); then the boorish
Callibius, who does not know how to rule free men (15. 7-8); then
Gylippus, who disgraces himself with his avarice (16-17. 1), and fits a
different but equally familiar type, the Spartan abroad who cannot resist
wealth; and finally Pausanias, with his lack of enterprise, style, or success.
In several ways, then, Plutarch gradually brings out the singular and
paradoxical features of Lysander's character; it is central to his point to bring
out how Mn stereotyped a Spartan this is, how he belies the normal
expectations which are pointed by those stereotyped foils; and he ends as
much less Spartan than that introduction at ch. 2 would suggest. And yet
his traits still cluster very naturally, the resourcefulness, the capacity to
exploit others, the deviousness, the unscrupulousness, and the bloodiness;
and we can see how readily all these traits complement those which were
introduced in the first chapter. The crucial ambition, (piXoti|j,ia, remains,
and he duly rejoices in the honours (Tinai) he is paid at 18. 4-19. 1; but
that ambition comes to go closely with a rising contempt for others (at 19.
1 Plutarch explicitly connects the two qualities). This megalomaniac
arrogance becomes a disabling weakness, especially at 22. 1-5; and—when
it is crossed—it develops into the eventual melancholic wrathfulness which
that early chapter had foreshadowed (2. 5, cf. 28. 1). The melancholia,
wrath, and megalomania might have come as more of a surprise if the
(piXoTinia had not served as a linking theme: that, surely, is why he is at
such pains to reintroduce the theme of the ambition in ch. 18, just before
the contempt and wrath become so important to the narrative. With that
firmly in our minds, nothing now seems too difficult or idiosyncratic; and
we again see how even an unstereotyped, singular figure shows traits which
cluster in a very "integrated," unmodem way, and how Plutarch carefully
controls his narrative in order to make the grouping more natural.^'
which Lysander so shrewdly knows how to generate. But only a very full commenury could
pursue such points through the whole Life. Some of the necessary material, but little of the
interpretation, is furnished in J. Smits' largely linguistic commentary (Amsterdam 1939).
^ On this technique in Lysander cf. D. A. Russell, "On reading Plutarch's Lives," G &R \i
(1966) 152-54.
^ It is interesting here to note a slightly different emphasis in the Synkrisis (Sulla 40 [2]. 6),
where Lysander is said to commit his outrages "on behalf of his friends," to secure their power
in the allied slates. One can see how that interpretation could fit the facts as the Lysander
narrative presents them: but it was not the tenor of the Life itself, where Lysander rather installs
his friends in power in the ruthless interest of his own, and Sparta's, power. The narrative
emphasis sits better with Lysander's other traits, whereas that of the Synkrisis would have left
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Whether we quite have the psychological understanding we expect from
a modem author is a different point. How far do we really grasp what turns
Lysander into so individual a Spartan? It would be wrong, surely, to think
that Plutarch traces much development in his character, except for that late
growth of arrogance and melancholia. Ch. 2 certainly links the "ambition
and contentiousness" to his education, and so posits a process of
development in his youth; but we do not see that development in any depth,
and thereafter Lysander does not really change from a Spartan into an
unspartan, nor do we see how those initial Spartan traits change into
counterparts which are less traditional and more subversive (interesting
though such a portrayal might have been). After that general introduction in
ch. 2, Lysander is fairly unspartan from the moment we see him, and the
conventional Callicratidas is his foil as early as 5. 7-7. 6. This is not
development, though this is equally a more unconventional figure than the
introduction had led us to expect: it is rather the same technique of
progressive redefinition, the use of an initial description which is
deliberately inadequate and then gradually refined. And yet the only
explanations of his character are given precisely in that initial description,
where we are given only the faintest suggestions of the character we are later
to see.
Even the attitude to wealth, explicitly marked at 2. 6-8 as an individual
and unspartan trait, is explained rather disappointingly. It simply seems to
be related to the poverty of his family background (a view which was clearly
controversial, and one which Plutarch can only support by straining the
slight evidence he had).^° But that penury, as Plutarch presents it, only
explains Lysander's capacity to do without wealth himself: it does not help
us to understand why he developed so shrewd an ability to exploit the
avarice of others, or why he so catastrophically kept sending wealth back
home to Sparta. Given Plutarch's capacity for imaginative reconstruction,
he might so easily have built a picture of Lysander's first reaction to seeing
foreign luxury, a mixture perhaps of inner contempt and ruthless
determination to exploit it for Sparta's interests.^' Plutarch could even have
gone further: had he wanted to prefigure Lysander's later insensitivity, he
his character less "integrated"; ironically, the Synkrisis point is closer to the treatment afforded
AgesUaus in his Life, where susceptibility to friends is an important theme. So too Lysander's
AaKtoviicf) 8iaita is more stressed in the Synkrisis (JSulla 41[3]. 2) than in the narrative: in
the narrative we might have inferred it from his attitude to wealth, but too insistent a stress
would have sat uneasily with the emphasis on his style in courting wealthy luxurious
potentates, so different from that of a Callicratidas (5. 5-7. 1).
'"For the controversy cf. e. g. 18. 3, Athen. 12. 543b, Nep. Lys. 4. Plutarch's presentation
may be influenced by the comparison with the poor but noble SuUa, as Dr. O. D. Watkins has
suggested to me.
'' Twentieth-century treatments of Russian moles in the British establishment offer
suggestive parallels.
272 Illinois Classical Studies, Xin.2
might have linked the contempt for wealth with a failure to grasp what it
would really mean for Sparta; had he preferred to stress the self-seeking, he
might rather have suggested a shrewd perception of exactly what wealth
might mean, and of the possibilities of power it might leave for a person
who remained impervious to its charms. Yet this style of reconstruction
was not what he was here interested in, though other Lives suggest that it
was well within his range: this peculiarly rich Life already had enough
paradoxes and contrasts to satisfy his taste.
And what tasty paradoxes and contrasts were these? A further oddity of
ch. 2 gives one clue. It might be natural enough to regard "ambition" or
"love of honour," <piXoTi|x{a, as a product of the Spartan educational
training; "contentiousness" certainly clusters closely with "ambition," but is
a less expected Spartan trait. The beginning of Agesilaus is suggestive
here, for the qualities Agesilaus inherits from the Spartan dyoyfri are there
his "common touch and kindliness of manner" (I. 5), while his
contentiousness is made a more individual feature (2. 1): that too is not a
wholly cogent treatment ("kindliness of manner," to (piA^vGpconov, does
not really convince as a Spartan trait), but it certainly suggests a rather
different view of the dyoyyTi from that of Lysander. Perhaps the reason is
that in Lysander it will indeed be important to find these traits of ambition
and contentiousness recurring in other Spartans, especially in Agesilaus
himself, men who had presumably suffered the same training. What is
more, this will contribute decisively to Lysander's final reverses: for,
singular though Lysander may be, it is a peculiar irony that he is finally
destroyed when he encounters the same traits in others. His capacity to
court (Gepajtetieiv) foreign dynasts was always a strength, as 2. 4 stressed
and as was immediately clear in his dealings with Cyrus (4. 1-6): but,
when he returns to Asia Minor at 19. 1-2, he himself comes to play the
dynast, and it is those who pay court to him (o'l GepaneiJovTeq, 19. 2) who
inflame his ambition and his contempt. That is just the point where the
reversals in his fortune begin to become important, and Plutarch stresses the
distaste he aroused among conventional Spartans (19. 3, 19. 7 ff., though
cf. already 14. 3).^^ Then these same GEpaneuovxeg are instrumental in
provoking the discord between Lysander and Agesilaus, when Agesilaus is
so irritated that no court is paid to him; Lysander himself has eventually to
advise them to go and Gepajteueiv Agesilaus instead (23. 5-11). Here of
course it is Agesilaus' own (piXoTinIa and contentiousness which is at play
(cf. 23. 3); Lysander cannot control his own (piA,o-ci|iia in response (23. 7);
but by now, clearly, he is meeting his match. He similarly is outdone in
deviousness by Phamabazus (20: cf. especially 20. 2, np6(; KpfiTa 8' dpa
'^The placing of the digressions on Spartan wealth, 17, and the skutale, 19. 8-12, is thought-
provoking. The length of both may seem clumsy, but both in different ways stress elements of
distinctive Spartan Iradition: and it is precisely now that Lysander's unconventional traits are
leaving him dangerously at odds with traditional Spartan !
Christopher Felling 273
. . .
Kpr|-c{^cov, and 20. 5, "ouk dp' 'C)8\)oaeiji; eoxiv al^uXcx; \i6voq"); and
ephors and kings are showing themselves able to meddle in local party
politics as well (21. 2-7). Lysander was unspartan enough; but, when he
sets the tone, others can readily follow, and combine to generate his
catastrophe. He duly dies, in battle: and in that battle a crucial role is
played by 300 Thebans who had been accused of Laconising and were eager
to prove their loyalty (28. 12). The local feudings which Lysander had
always exploited so deftly come to play a strange role at the end.
The reversals combine to generate a peripeteia of peculiar neatness. It
is indeed highly reminiscent of tragedy, where so often a figure's peculiar
characteristics or strengths unleash forces which eventually destroy him,
frequently with a chilling symmetry: one thinks of Oedipus, or
Clytemnestra, or Ajax, or Hippolytus, or the Creon of AntigoneP It is no
surprise, indeed, to find a fitting dominance of tragic imagery in the closing
chapters of the Life. With Agesilaus in Asia, for instance, it is "like a
tragedy," with Lysander as a chief actor playing a subordinate social role
(23. 6); when Lysander begins his plot to subvert the constitution, he is
coonep Ev TpaYcp5ia |iTixavTiv al'pcov enl loxx; noXnaq (25. 2), adducing
for his case a series of prophecies and oracles—themselves of course the
stuff of tragedy; and finally "Lysander's part in the drama came to an end
through the cowardice of one of his actors and accomplices" (26. 6), men
who had earlier been described as his "fellow actors in the dramatic plot"
(zov fi-oGou ovvaycovioTai, 26. 2).^'' After that, what more suitable
setting for Lysander's death could there be than the birthplace of Dionysus,
the god of tragedy himself (28. 7)? For indeed, as often in tragedy, we are
surely aware of numinous powers at play as he meets his death, and that is
particularly appropriate for one who had so often taken the names of the
gods in vain: it is not, for instance, a casual coincidence that his death
miraculously and paradoxically proves -some ancient oracles true (29. 5-12).
One final irony is that Lysander, for all his deviousness and megalomania,
has usually promoted Sparta's interest with some sureness of touch: many
for instance had been eager to see his return to Asia, rather than more of the
virtuous Callicratidas (5. 7-8, 7. 2). Even as the rift with his country
grows deeper, he is still alert to performing what service he can (23. 13); it
is his domestic enemies whose meddling comes to endanger the city (21.2-
7). The charge was laid against Pausanias that he had taken the Athenian
people when they were bridled by an oligarchy, and loosed them for further
violence and arrogance: that increased Lysander's reputation as a man who
had ruled in a powerful and individual style, but not to gratify others nor
^^ For the influence of tragedy on Plutarch see now J. M. Mossman, "Tragedy and Epic in
Plutarch's Alexander" JHS 108 (1988) 83-93.
^ Cf. Smits (as n. 27) ad loc. avvaYcovioTTi^ can itself be used more generally (cf. LSJ s.v.
and Wyttenbach's index), but hardly with Toti (luSou, or in this context of extended theatrical
imagery.
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theatrically (ouSe QeaipiKSx;), but in pursuit of Sparta's interests" (21. 7).
Clearly, Lysander is not the only actor in this drama, nor is it only his
tragedy. Tom by discord and corrupted by wealth, Sparta is a victim too.
This is a very fine and tightly structured Life, and its moralism is
thought-provoking and profound. But few of its themes really depend on
understanding Lysander's psychology, and one can see why Plutarch did not
make this his priority. What is more, this is a different moralism from that
ofAratus, and one which combines with an "integrated" character in a rather
different way. Polycrates' children might be able to draw simple morals
from Aratus' history for their own experience; but none of Plutarch's
audience were likely to find themselves in any remotely similar
circumstances to Lysander's, or feel tempted to behave in any remotely
similar way. True, none would feel tempted to go and assert Greece's
independence in the style of Aratus or Philopoemen either, but in those
cases latter-day analogies could be found, and Polycrates' sons could still feel
inspired to behave with circumspect worthiness of their Greek past. In the
case oi Lysander it is hard to see what even these latter-day analogies would
be: after all, no reader would find his temperament chafing against Spartan
discipline in any remotely parallel style, nor be tempted to turn himself into
any equivalent of a melancholic or megalomaniac dynast. The moralism in
such a case is of a different sort, rather closer to that of tragedy: this is a
more descriptive moralism, pointing a truth of human experience rather than
building a model for crude imitation or avoidance. Human nature can
produce a figure like Lysander, even or especially in a city like Sparta; and
figures like that tend to generate their own destruction, in tragically
appropriate ways. For an audience brought up on "integrated" characters, the
more tightly Lysander's traits would cluster, the more convincing they
might find him: to that extent, the integration of his characterisation once
again reinforces the moralism, though not in the sense that Plutarch's
audience might really fear growing into Lysanders themselves, or finding
one in other people. Indeed, Plutarch's readers might not find themselves
behaving very differently at all after understanding Lysander's story. But
they would find their grasp of the human experience enhanced: and, if a
moralist could achieve that, he was achieving something very worthwhile.
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